11/10: Bio Terrorism & GIS
Responding to the Threat of Agricultural Bioterrorism
By Shawn Hutchinson
In October 2004, Kevin Coleman discussed the susceptibility of the U.S. food supply chain to bioterrorist attack. Given events surrounding the recent E. coli outbreak in spinach grown in the U.S., now is an ideal time to revisit the subject of food safety by expanding upon the place of agriculture in the United States and some of the ways in which geospatial technology, and its practitioners, can address this area of homeland security.
The vital roles played by agriculture (and those employed in that sector of our economy) are largely underappreciated by many people. These roles include the provision of food, maintenance of healthy ecosystem function, and enhancement of aesthetic qualities. However, the "selling point" most often used to convey the importance of agriculture, and to capture the attention of decision makers, is simple economics. Various reports published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS) show that agriculture is a multi-billion dollar industry, with the total value of agricultural products exceeding $117 billion dollars, and that of agriculture and related industries topping $563 billion.
While many of the plant and animal products grown or raised in the U.S. are used domestically, a significant portion is also exported to other nations. In 2004, total U.S. agricultural exports were estimated at $61.4 billion - with agriculture being one of the few trade sectors in which the U.S. often exports a higher value commodity than we import. While these national figures are certainly impressive, the economics of agriculture is perhaps even more important at the state and county scales. Consider, for instance, that farm income accounts for over 30% of the total income in many rural U.S. counties.
So, the "grand challenge" for domestic food safety and security programs is then twofold: To ensure access to a safe, reliable and inexpensive food supply and, at the same time, to maintain the profitability of plant and animal production systems. However, our collective ability to meet this challenge is under constant threat.
We face, for example, the nearly impossible task of stopping invasive pests and introduced pathogens from entering the country. Unfortunately, the number of such introductions will not only continue, but likely increase, if for no other reason than sheer logistics. In fiscal year (FY) 2005, the U.S. imported nearly 27 million metric tons of agricultural products (excluding wine and malt beverages). Of this amount, significantly less than 5% was subjected to thorough inspection. Despite this low inspection rate, the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection agency seized a daily average of over 1,100 prohibited agricultural products at ports of entry in FY 2005, including 147 agricultural pests.
The financial impact of disease and pest management is significant, costing the agricultural industry in the neighborhood of $3 billion per year. The projected economic impact of one disease alone, Asian soybean rust (first introduced into the U.S. in 2004), is upwards of $2 billion. This, and future introductions may result in restrictions on domestic and foreign trade, disruptions in food production, changes in consumer perceptions and confidence, and employment declines within all aspects of agriculture and food markets.
Given the monetary importance of the agricultural sector, it is not an overstatement to say that the economic well-being of the nation, and that of many rural communities, is susceptible to significant disruption. Several additional factors further expose U.S. agriculture to the harm posed by natural and intentional introductions of pests and pathogens. These "multiplying" factors include a genetic simplification of planted landscapes and food animal lines that makes crops and livestock more susceptible to disease, the difficulty of monitoring plant and animal conditions (i.e., situational awareness) over large geographic areas, and the concentrations of crops and livestock production at local and regional scales.
One framework which can be used to plan for and execute our response to agricultural biosecurity events is the emergency response cycle outlined by hazards researchers. Here the term "hazard" is considered broadly, and can be applied equally to natural events, technological failures and biological agents. The cycle of emergency response begins with "preparedness" - how people and places plan to deal with a hazard event. Eventually, a disaster happens (such as a tornado) and it tests how well we have prepared for that hazard. We respond to the emergency by rescuing people and addressing other immediate threats to life, limb and property. Following response is the recovery stage, which includes "cleaning up" after the disaster and other efforts geared toward getting back to "normal" conditions. Next, and often concurrent with the later recovery activities, is the mitigation phase. Here, the disaster and our reaction to it are assessed, and ways to improve preparedness, response and recovery are identified. Finally we transition back to the preparedness stage, await the next hazard and begin the whole process again.
This same emergency response cycle can be used to guide our actions in the event of a biological hazard and, I believe, contribute to an operational definition of food safety and agricultural biosecurity:
"The ability to develop, maintain, and execute a rapid and effective emergency response to disease outbreaks and invasive species in order to ensure a safe, constant, and profitable supply of food, feed, and fiber." (Author's unpublished quote)
Geospatial technologies have played, and will continue to play, a key role in the development, maintenance and execution of emergency response cycles related to food security and agricultural biosecurity events. One example that illustrates this role is a spatial model for locating large-scale livestock carcass disposal sites.
Consider for a moment a scenario where Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is detected in beef cattle within a commercial feedlot. After confirming the diagnosis, the relevant state department of agriculture working in conjunction with the USDA will implement some form of an animal carcass disposal plan. That plan will involve destroying cattle from the affected feedlot, as well as those from neighboring operations within an established quarantine zone, to prevent the spread of the disease. For some states, such as Kansas, the preferred disposal mechanism is burial. The next logical question to ask, then, is where to bury as many as several hundred thousand head of cattle found within the quarantine zone?
To help solve this problem, we can view and simultaneously analyze a series of thematic data layers in a GIS-based landscape suitability model to prepare our emergency response. Geographical datasets including environmental and cultural information related to soils, geology, water resources, transportation networks, threatened and endangered species, and population can be combined into automated digital workflows using functionality built into commercial GIS software packages. The model created for the State of Kansas currently uses twelve data layers that represent "exclusion criteria" developed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE). These data are then subjected to various geoprocessing procedures to produce maps that identify the cumulative geographic area falling within the spatial extent of one or more of the predefined exclusion criteria - in other words, the least preferred sites for carcass burial.
Running this model yields results such as that shown here for Finney County, Kansas. Green areas on the map represent locations that do not violate any exclusion criteria and, therefore, would be preferred burial sites. Based upon the KDHE exclusion criteria, nearly 40% of the county would be unsuitable for animal burial. It is important to note that licensed animal feeding operations are required by the state to develop a plan for onsite livestock burial. However, a visual comparison between actual feedyard locations (not shown on map for security reasons) and preferred mass burial locations indicates a potential flaw in this strategy - and that onsite burial may not actually be in the long term interests of regional populations.
Figure 2. Results from GIS-based animal carcass disposal site evaluation model for Finney County, Kansas (unpublished data, Geographic Information Systems Spatial Analysis Laboratory, Department of Geography, Kansas State University). (Click for larger image)
Given the automated nature of this method, emergency managers now have a sound procedure, based upon good science, for rapidly identifying suitable burial sites before and during an event. The ability to "pre-emptively" target preferred sites for burial is especially helpful when negotations are required to obtain burial rights on private lands.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, several post-event analyses have highlighted the importance of both GIS and geographic data in providing rapid and effective emergency response. Summarized from Galloway (2003), some of those key findings include:
* Having geographic datasets for critical infrastructure already developed and on-hand prior to an emergency
* Having the human and information technology infrastructure in place to facilitate sharing geographic information
* The importance of graphical forms of communication, such as maps, in conveying information to both decision makers and the public
* Having made a "pre-response" investment in developing relevant decision support tools
We must take these hard lessons learned in the aftermath of intentional attacks on urban centers and apply them equally, and urgently, to the area of agricultural biosecurity. As noted by Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) in 2001, our nation’s crops and livestock are at very high risk. It is time for the U.S. to make an appropriate investment in food safety and security.
References:
Cutter, S.L. 2003. GI Science, disasters, and emergency management. Transactions in GIS 7(4):439-445.
Galloway, G.E. 2003. Emergency preparedness and response: Lessons learned from 9/11. In Cutter, S.L., Richardson, D.B., and Wilbanks, T.J. (eds) Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism. New York, Routledge: 27-34.
Thomas, D.S.K., S.L. Cutter, M. Hodgson, M. Gutekunst, and S. Jones. 2002. Use of Spatial Data and Geographic Technologies in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack. Boulder, CO, University of Colorado, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Quick Response Bulletin No. 153 (available at ).
Bioterrorism and the Food Supply
By Kevin Coleman
(Oct 01, 2004)
The goal of terrorists is to strike fear in the hearts of their targets.This can take many forms. They may wish to cause death, shock, economic disruption, loss of faith in authorities, psychological trauma, dread, or just uncertainty.Perhaps the act that would most readily accomplish this would be an attack on the United States' food supply.Protecting the food supply has been a priority for public health officials for decades.Traditionally, industry and regulators have depended on spot-checks of manufacturing conditions and random sampling of final products to ensure safe food.This system is seen as more reactive than preventive because it finds problems after they have occurred rather than as the food is being prepared.
So what is at stake? Here are some interesting statistics about the food supply-chain in the United States.These are just from just the Mid-Atlantic region.
Mid-Atlantic Food Supply
* Number of farms = over 100,000
* Number of post-farm businesses = nearly 150,000
* Private Sector Food Business = over 12% of private sector businesses involve food
* Collective Sales = over $300 billion
* Employment = nearly 12% of the workforce
The introduction by terrorists of noxious or lethal materials into foods or beverages could result in undetected, rapid and widespread distribution within the food supply-chain that relies on distributed food production, processing and transportation firms.There are really three types of terrorist threats to the food supply.
1) The use of food or water as a delivery mechanism for pathogens, chemicals, and/or other harmful substances for the purpose of causing human illness or death.
2) The introduction of anti-crop or anti-livestock agents into agricultural systems.
3) The physical disruption of the flow of food/water as a result of the destruction of transportation or other vital infrastructure.
So how vulnerable is our food supply? That is a question that has been asked by scientists and government officials.The answer lies in an analysis of the "food" supply-chain.The supply chain begins with a vast number of producers (farms) and the numerous transportation, processing and distribution facilities that are all part of bringing the food to the point of consumption.It is estimated that 98 percent of all U.S.farms are family farms.This small, highly distributed food production network creates security, monitoring and tracking challenges. Very large factory farms make up only 3 percent of the total farms but contribute more than 40 percent of the output.In addition to being vulnerable to terrorist attacks, this system makes it exceedingly difficult to trace back and identify the source of the contaminated food.
Figure 1 examines the likelihood of a bioterrorism attack against the U.S.food supply and the impact of such an attack.Four recent GAO reports found gaps in federal controls for protecting agriculture and the food supply.Local, state and federal officials must do even more to protect our food supply from tampering. A new comprehensive approach is needed if we are to safeguard our food supply.
* Document the "food" supply-chain
* Analyze risks and vulnerabilities
* Identify critical control points
* Establish monitoring procedures
* Develop response plan
* Develop reporting and tracking system
* Develop system reliability checks
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the Bioterrorism Act) directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to take steps to protect the public from a threatened or actual terrorist attack on the U.S.food supply.
Exempt from these regulations are the transportation vehicles that hold food only in the usual course of business.As you could imagine the ability to attack our food supply while in transit from the production site is a critical area and possibly the area that has the least amount of protection currently.It is important to recognize that this is only one of many exceptions granted under the act.
Protecting U.S.agriculture and ensuring safe and wholesome meat and poultry is one of the primary challenges facing USDA.The office of the Inspector General of the United States Department of Agriculture's chief missions is to ensure the safety of the food supply, both by auditing food safety programs to detect deficiencies and recommend improvements and by investigating criminal activity involving the intentional contamination of food products.They also monitor the processing and sale of adulterated meat, poultry, and egg products; and the substitution, adulteration or other misrepresentation of food products regulated or inspected by USDA.
Technology
The Department of Homeland Security in June 2004 announced the first Designations and Certifications under the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act.The SAFETY Act provides liability limitations for makers and sellers of qualified anti-terrorism technologies, including those that may be used to protect the nation's food supply.DHS is also developing a new National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) to support the law enforcement and intelligence communities in their biodefense responsibilities. The Center will apply the newest advances in science to the challenges both of biological threat characterization and of bioforensics, strengthening the nation's ability to determine the source of a biological agent used in an attack and strengthening deterrence.In June 2004, DHS announced its new Regional Technology Integration (RTI) initiative.RTI provides a mechanism for working directly with urban areas on infrastructure protection (including protection of the food supply) to develop and deliver new technologies as part of a regional security response.The program focuses on regional collaboration, private sector solutions, measurable objectives and continuous evaluation, and communicating best practices and lessons learned to other communities, states, Congress, the Administration, and other federal agencies.
The support is there.Now all that is needed is a workable platform that can provide an economically feasible solution to safeguarding our food supply.A critical component of this platform will, without question, be a GIS system that supports tracking and traceability.Incorporated into the platform will also be RFID capabilities to trace the product throughout the food supply-chain. These hybrid tags will also serve to detect tampering and integrated with new biosensors will alert food processors to possible contaminates.But this platform will not be cheap.The question is can the platform be developed and implemented in time to protect the population from a bioterrorist attack against our food supply? Only time will answer that question.
Conclusion
The food supply is by far the most vulnerable to a bioterrorism attack.This year we learned from news reports that terrorists have developed materials to manufacture salmonella and botulinum, and they may have intended to poison the food supply.Even more alarming was a Washington Post article on biological weapons developed by the South African government under the apartheid regime, including a biological agent created by splicing a common strain of E.coli with a toxin-producing gene from Clostridium perfringens.These are only a handful of examples of food bioterrorism that demonstrate the health and economic damage that could be inflicted through an attack on the food supply.
We need to continue to strengthen our food supply surveillance systems and improve communication and coordination among local, state and federal agencies to heighten the ability to recognize and quickly respond to food-borne outbreaks.This will not be cheap or able to be accomplished in a short period of time.
posted by POLYGLOT at 8:49 PM
1 Comments:
I should be very interested in the authors' opinions of the paper US Agricultural and Food Security: Who Will Provide the Leadership? by Floyd P. Horn, PhD and Roger Breeze, BVMS, PhD, MRCVS of the Centaur Science Group Washington. They say, "...In our view, a federal or state official equipped with an Internet-linked detection device should be on the site of any suspected foreign animal disease outbreak in the U.S. within 4 hours or less of notification so that vigorous informed control measures backed by positive diagnosis can be implemented nationally within 6 hours.
Once the presence of FMD is confirmed, as part of an Internet-based Command and Control system, continuous real-time surveillance must be employed to define the extent of the problem around the initial detection and to predict and track the progress of infection through the national agricultural commerce streams.
And to prevent natural introduction, real time surveillance must also be extended to all commercial flows entering the U.S. This cannot be achieved by taking samples to a central laboratory...."
Talk of mass burial sites and carcass disposal assumes mass slaughter. But the technology exists now to preclude the dreadful disruption and misery of mass slaughter and disposal measures. We had this in the UK in 2001. Mass slaughter is a very nasty, bloody nightmare - and an unnecessary one. The countryside became a sort of war zone - the very thing that any terrorist would rejoice to see. But the now validated rapid on-site diagnosis and GIS portaqble kits mean swift containment measures and safety for surrounding farms.
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